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ADAM SMITH AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE:
A REJECTION OF THE STADIAL MODEL?
BY

MARIA PIA PAGANELLI

Adam Smith allegedly offers a model of economic development in both his Lectures
on Jurisprudence and the Wealth of Nations—the so-called four stages of development model. The model presents a linear unfolding view of economic development
from primitive to advanced stages. But Smith’s own historical examples systematically contradict this model. I thus question whether Adam Smith actually endorses
and uses the four stages model of development to illustrate development and suggest
that if he does, he does it to discredit it instead. For Smith, history teaches that
development is more accidental than ﬁtting deterministic models.

I.
Considering the stadial model of development as a model of economic development in
Adam Smith independently from the historical empirical evidence he offers may be
problematic. Smith allegedly offers a clear stadial model of development both in his
Lectures on Jurisprudence ([1762–63] 1982) and in the Wealth of Nations ([1776]
1981). Yet, Smith also presents lists of historical examples that contradict his alleged
model, perhaps questioning the validity of the model instead of endorsing it, if he does
indeed use that model at all.
I ﬁrst look at the alleged model of the four stages of development as presented in the
Lectures on Jurisprudence, then at some of the historical examples of development in
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the Wealth of Nations, namely, the development of towns as well as the development of
early civilizations and of late colonial development. All the examples Smith uses are
exceptions to his allegedly theoretical model, a strange choice if Smith really wanted to
use that model to explain development.
What I will not do is to formalize Smith’s model, as Walter Eltis (1975) and Samuel
Hollander (1973) have done for growth, but stay with Smith’s narrative. I will not take
part in the debate on Smith’s materialism (Pascal 1938; Meek 1976; Skinner 1982) or
lack of it (Winch 1983a; Haakonssen 1981), about which John Salter (1992) provides a
review, but I will look at Smith’s use of stadial models of development and the examples
he uses. While I agree with Hla Myint (1977) that Smith has a “trade–cum–
development” theory, I differ from Myint (1958) when he looks at the validity of
Smith’s model with actual empirical facts. I focus exclusively on what Smith himself
offers as empirical data, and not on whether his historical account of development is
correct. Additionally, I agree with Paul Bowles (1986) that the disconnection between
theory and facts is a problem, but I do not share his view that this is a failure on Smith’s
part due to the inﬂuence the Physiocrats had on him. If Smith failed to establish “that the
‘natural progress of opulence’ described the way in which economies would, if left to
themselves, develop, and that his failure … results from his methodological approach
and, in particular, from the fact that the ‘natural progress of opulence’ was an a priori
concept formulated without reference to historical evidence” (Bowles 1986, p. 110),
why would Smith be bothered to continuously list historical evidence that contradicts his
model? I thus raise the question as to whether Smith himself was questioning the use of
the stadial model as a model of development.
The particular form of the model of stages of development I consider implies that
“societies undergo development through successive stages based on different modes of
subsistence” (Meek 1976, p. 6; emphasis in original). The key to this stadial model is
thus not just that the modes of subsistence determine the stages of societies but that there
is development from one stage to another, that there is progress in society, even if it is
possible that different modes of subsistence coexist at the same time. This is the crucial
aspect of Ronald Meek’s interpretation—that “development should be regarded as
proceeding through four normally consecutive stages” (Meek 1971, p. 10)—which, in
my reading, Smith either does not adopt, or, if interpreted as adopting, I suggest Smith is
criticizing rather than endorsing. In this I agree with James Alvey (2003) that teleological
interpretations of Smith are problematic. I differ from Alvey as I do not think “Smith was
confused” (Alvey 2003, p. 19), as I suggest that Smith either does not adopt a model of
stadial development as a model of development, or, if he uses it, he does it to criticize it,
not to endorse it.
Indeed, I take issue with Meek and Meek-like interpretations that see, as Meek would
say, that “in the beginning all the world was America … America … is a pattern of the
ﬁrst ages in Asia and Europe” (John Locke, cited in Meek 1976, p. 22)—the idea of
stages of development that implies a more or less “orderly sequence or succession of
different modes of subsistence through which societies could be conceived as progressing over time” (Meek 1976, p. 23) even if different societies may at the same time be at
different stages. This does not mean that I do not see development in Smith. Development is an historical fact in Smith. But the way in which Smith explains this historical
fact is not through a stadial model of “orderly sequence or succession of different modes
of subsistence.” This does not mean, either, that Smith does not consider different stages
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of society. He does, of course. But, following Christopher Berry (1997, 2013), I suggest
that the stages of society in Smith are simply a pedagogical heuristic, a classiﬁcation of
different kinds of society, and in a sense not dissimilar from Aristotle’s (1877) classiﬁcation
of hunting, pastoral, and agricultural societies in Book I of Politics. The four stages are a
taxonomy of different relations between means of production and social, moral, political,
and legal institutions, not a model of development from one stage to another. It may not
be an accident that Smith tends to use “state of society” rather than “stage of society,”
where “stage” is a point, period, or step in a process or development, while “state” refers
to the particular condition that someone or something is in at a speciﬁc time.1
That Meek-like interpretations face problems is not new. Contra Meek, Smith fails to
present any data in support of the actual stadial development of societies. To the contrary,
his supporting data contradict stadial development. And yet, there seems to be a
reluctance to abandon this idea of inevitable progress in Smith (cf. Campbell and Skinner
1976; Winch 1983b; Haakonssen 1981; Evensky 2005). Even if one takes the softer
interpretation of Harro M. Hopﬂ (1978) that “conjectural history is concerned with the
typical society … and its ‘natural’ (that is to say, typical) progress through the stages of
advancement, there need be no correspondence between the natural course of progress
and the actual ‘empirical’ history of a particular society, for the latter might be fraught
with ‘accidents’” (Hopﬂ 1978, p. 31), we run into the problem of Smith offering no
empirical support, and the one he offers goes in the opposite direction. Similarly, James
Alvey (2003, p. 20) concludes, “It seems to be an impossible task to make Smith
consistent other than by ignoring some passages in his work.” But then he tries to save a
teleological reading of Smith, saying, “Perhaps we can conclude by proposing that Smith
is an 80-per-cent optimist” (2003, p. 20; “optimist” because of the telos of human
progress). On the other hand, the problem of inconsistency does not arise if we think that
having different kinds of societies does not imply that one will develop into another, or
that the inconsistency is presented to question the correctness of the model.
If one really wants more than just a classiﬁcation system from the stages of society in
Smith, if one really wants to attribute the presence of a stadial model of development to
Smith, which may be questionable, a possible alternative way of reading Smith may
instead be that Smith knew well that the four stages could be used as a development
model à la Meek, but he could not get himself to support it. Rather, he offered an
alternative. After all, he tells us, we are naturally driven to build models, to build
systems, to explain an otherwise puzzling reality. So, we observe nature and to alleviate
our anxiety at seeing all these disconnected events, we imagine “invisible chains which
bind together all these disjointed objects … [thus] … introduc[ing] order into this chaos
of jarring and discordant appearances” (Smith 1982, “Astronomy 12,” pp. 45–46): we
develop theoretical systems. But these models are the products of our imagination; and
they are not necessarily correct or deﬁnite. So, in his essay “History of Astronomy,”
Smith goes through the history of astronomical systems—models of the skies meant to
link together different phenomena. But when a system is unable to deal with empirical
evidence that does not ﬁt, eventually that system is replaced with a different one
(on different ways of evolution of knowledge within economics, see Khalil 1995).
In the Wealth of Nations, we have the description (and the criticism) of two economic
systems: the mercantile system and the agricultural system. Both systems offer a more or
1

I thank a referee for suggesting these deﬁnitions of “stage” and “state.”
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less coherent way to connect the dots of economic phenomena with invisible chains. Yet,
these systems, like the astronomical systems, are meant to be replaced by other systems
better able to explain more otherwise unexplainable things. Allan D. Megill (1975), I
think correctly, notes that Wealth of Nations is not a system of political economy but an
inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations: an inquiry, not a system. In
this light, one may read Smith’s account of economic development not as an endorsement of a Meek-like stadial theory but as a criticism of it. Whenever there are things that
violate the order we expect to ﬁnd, we are surprised and we wonder. We try to reconcile
them and to smooth them into that invisible chain that we imagine being present. But
eventually too much evidence contrary to the current system will lead us to look for a
different way to connect those dots. When the empirical data do not ﬁt our model, we
eventually start looking for a different one, like we did with astronomy. So, when none of
the empirical data ﬁts our stadial model of economic development, maybe it is time to
inquire again into what causes nations to develop and grow richer.

II. LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE
The clearest exposition of Smith’s stages of development comes from the set of his
students’ notes complied into the Lectures of Jurisprudence ([1762–63] 1982). The
Lectures on Jurisprudence (LJA) were found well after Smith’s death and thus not
published by Smith or during Smith’s time. Given that Smith asked his executors to burn
all his non-published writing before he died, and that the lectures are students’ notes, not
Smith’s own notes, some may hesitate to use them with the same weight as Smith’s
approved published works. The Lectures on Jurisprudence are generally considered
useful, though, because they contain, among others, earlier drafts of what would become
the Wealth of Nations ([1776] 1981).
In these lectures we can ﬁnd what is known as the “four stages of development.” Stage
theory was a common construct of the Scottish Enlightenment, as Craig Smith (2006)
demonstrated (cf. Berry 2013; see also Meek 1971). And Adam Smith, consistently with
this Scottish background, seems to present his version of it. On December 24, 1762,
Smith tells his students “there are four distinct stages which mankind passes thro: —1st,
the Age of Hunters, 2dly, the Age of Shepherds; 3dly, the Age of Agriculture; and 4thly,
the Age of Commerce” (LJA i.27). During the semester he elaborates on this “natural
progress which men make in society” (LJA iv.19). Smith explains that we start from
hunting societies, where the “the ﬁrst method [these small societies] would fall upon for
their subsistence would be to support themselves by the wild fruits and wild animalls
which the country afforded” (LJA i.27). By eventually realizing that domesticating
animals provides an easier source of food, we then arrive at the age of shepherds.
Population growth would follow a more stable supply of food and would push for an ever
more steady provision. “Then they would naturally turn themselves to the cultivation of
land and raising plants and trees as produced nourishment ﬁt for them…. And by this
means they would gradually advance into the age of agriculture” (LJA i.31). So, after
having enough ﬂocks and herds to be able to afford to cultivate some land, and after
having enough produce to support themselves, people will have superﬂuous products
with which to start to trade. And society will eventually develop into its age of
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commerce. Each stage of development has its appropriate form of justice and of
government and its appropriate customs. And from each stage allegedly a society will
eventually carry into the following stage. This is “the normal process of development”
(Skinner 1975, p. 155). The model seems simple, clear, and quite reasonable.
Yet, if I were to give an historical example to explain and corroborate this model, I
would say: take country x for example. During century y, people were few and they were
hunters. As population increased, they became shepherds. In century yy, more or less,
they started to cultivate land extensively and, now, x is in its commercial age. But this is
not what Smith does. This is not the way Smith gives empirical support to his model. He
tells his students that North American Indians are an example of the ﬁrst stage of
development, “tho they have no conception of ﬂocks and herds, have nevertheless some
notion of agriculture … [even if] this can hardly be called agriculture” (LJA i.29). “The
Tartars and Arabians subsist almost entirely by their ﬂocks and herds. The Arabs have
little agriculture, but the Tartars none at all” (LJA i.29). And France is offered as an
example of commercial society, without any previous stage of it being mentioned. We do
encounter the Tartars and the Arabs again, on “Febry 21” and “Febry 23,” 1762. But here
Smith tells his students that this natural gradual development somehow stalled with them
as they are “two great nations who have been merely shepherds as far back as we can
trace them and still are so without the least agriculture” (LJA iv.36).
Even if we try to think of Smith as using conjectural history—conjecturing how
societies might have developed in the absence of direct evidence by looking at
different societies—so that “at the beginning we were all America,” we run into the
problem that we should all have been Tartary too, and eventually we will all become
France. But, here again, this is not what Smith tells us. He tells us that America did not
become Tartary, as we will see below; that the Tartars have always been and always
will be Tartary, because of the nature of their land, as mentioned above. And France,
well, we are simply not told. France is just France. These may be good examples of
classiﬁcation, not of development.
So, if we believe that Smith uses the stadial model of development as a model of
development, then Smith tells his students there is a model of economic development
and offers them examples of societies that do not develop. The situation does not
improve when we look at what Smith tells posterity with his published works.

III. WEALTH OF NATIONS
In the Wealth of Nations (WN) the explicit mention of the four stages of development
disappears. There are references to hunters, shepherds, agricultural, and commercial
societies, and to development, especially in books III and V, but there is no explicit use of
a model of linear development from one stage to another. Yet, if we really want to keep
the model of the four stages of development in mind, we run into additional empirical
problems.
Assuming the implicit presence of the four stages model, what does Smith tell us of
civilizations that have evolved over time? Take Rome. Smith tells us “Rome … was
originally founded upon an Agrarian law” (WN IV.vii.a.3, p. 556). Where is the age of
shepherds, not to speak of the age of hunters, that precedes the age of agriculture? They
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may have been there, but this is not what Smith tells us. Rome was founded on agrarian
law—no mention of what was there before, if anything.
Let’s look at something more recent, then. Book III is a broad account of the feudal
era, from its beginning to its fall. Here, Smith also tells us that “the cultivation and
improvement of the country, therefore which affords subsistence, must necessarily, be
prior to the increase of the towns, which furnishes only the means of conveniency and
luxury” (WN III.i.2, p. 377). He also tells us, “According to the natural course of things,
therefore, the greater part of the capital of every growing society is, ﬁrst, directed to
agriculture, afterwards to manufactures, and last of all to foreign commerce. This order
of things is so very natural, that in every society that had any territory, it has always, I
believe, been in some degree observed” (WN III.i.8, p. 380). This seems to echo his
lectures: ﬁrst one develops agriculture (the country) and then, with the surplus products,
one starts trading and developing trading centers such as cities.
This is a good place to argue that Smith adopts the theoretical model of stages of
development. The chapter where this idea is presented is indeed titled “Of the Natural
Progress of Opulence.” But Smith describes the development of Europe as actually
“unnatural and retrograde” (WN III.i.9, p. 380). Rather than going from the agricultural
stage to the commercial one, Smith tells us, we went from an agricultural stage back to a
barbaric stage, to then jump into a commercial stage, following which agriculture
improved. Europe developed foreign trade ﬁrst, then manufacturers, and only later
agriculture. This is not a minor point Smith makes. He spends three of the four chapters
of Book III telling his readers the story of how the natural order of things is inverted. He
even explicitly warns his readers of this inversion of the natural course of things at the
end of the ﬁrst chapter by saying: “But though this natural order of things must have
taken place in some degree in every society, it has, in all modern states of Europe, been,
in many respects, entirely inverted” (WN III.i. 9, p. 380).
A combination of exogenous events such as the barbaric invasions and of local
politics, ranging from primogeniture laws to privileges the kings would grant to cities in
exchange for support against the nobility, gave incentives to people to cluster in cities for
protection, to develop trade, then manufacturers, and only later on to export to the
countryside the entrepreneurial spirit of commerce that develops agriculture, rather than
vice versa. This is why the European development had been “unnatural and retrograde.”
The historical data we are offered give us exactly the opposite result from what we
expected. The Meek-like theoretical model, therefore, by itself, has problems in explaining historical facts (note that Meek (1976, pp. 228–238) himself believed that the four
stages theory was conjectural).
Robert Blecker (1997, p. 534) explains the relevance of this “unnatural and retrograde
order”:
It allows for the endogenous development of absolute advantages and surplus capacities
by exploiting scale economies through the market-widening effects of trade. … It is a
view of economic development as a process in which countries develop in an interdependent manner, rather than autonomously. In the “unnatural and retrograde order”,
the evolution of national economies is fundamentally inﬂuenced and determined by
their position vis-à-vis each other in the international division of labour. In this vision of
an integrated global economy, an international division of labour arises endogenously
along with the productive capabilities of the nations that comprise it, as nations tend to
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develop absolute advantages cum surplus capacities in those goods in which (for
reasons that may be historical accidents) they initially specialize.

Should Blecker be correct, the question remains, and becomes even more resonant: Why
would Smith offer us a model of “natural development of opulence” if his actual model is
the “inverted” one?
Let’s consider another factor. In Lectures on Jurisprudence, Smith tells his students
that the engine of change is population growth. One society develops enough means of
subsistence to sustain a larger population and, because of the larger population, is pushed
to ﬁnd additional means of subsistence, going from hunting to the more stable domestication of animals, to agriculture and ﬁnally to commerce. This feedback loop is also
presented in Wealth of Nations, even if the emphasis is now more on population growth
as a symptom, not a cause, of economic development: if there is more to survive with,
more people will survive (WN I.viii).
What, then, does a Meek-like model of development as Smith allegedly presents it tell
us? Not much, it seems, when the historical account of it is taken into consideration.
Customs, institutions, and other historical accidents seem to play a larger explanatory
role than the model itself.
In defense of Smith, it is often claimed that, for Smith, the American experience
resembles his theory (WN II.v.21, p. 366; and III.i.5, pp. 378–379). But if we take
Anthony Brewer (1998) seriously, even this is an empirical failure of Smith’s alleged
theoretical model. Brewer claims the North American colonies cannot be considered an
example of natural development for two reasons. First, the process of colonization itself
implies that the barbaric colonies are colonized by civilized cultures. “An open economy
surrounded by more civilized centers” (1998, p. 93) can hardly be considered the norm;
rather, it is an exception. “Second, … [i]n the North American colonies, of course,
modern institutions were imported from Europe, where they were … the result of a
(much slower) process of development” (1998, p. 93). And, indeed, Smith tells us that
the difference between the success of America and the degradation of Bengal is the
adoption of the British constitution in America (WN I.viii.26, p. 91).
Looking at Book V of Wealth of Nations, where we have the most explicit reference to
the four stages, still does not improve the performance of the model as a model of
development. Smith uses the description of the four different states of societies to
explain differences in military organization and performance. Techniques and discipline
of the military change with each different state. The military develops from a group of
thugs to a proper army. So far, so good. But then we have the description of Rome, both
in Book V and in Book III. The sophisticated and civilized Roman Empire, given its
proven powers, relaxed its military discipline (WN V.I.a.36) and barbaric, uncivilized
German tribes overran it. “The rapine and violence which the barbarians exercised
against the ancient inhabitants, interrupted the commerce between the towns and the
country. The towns were deserted, and the country left uncultivated, and the Western
provinces of Europe, which had enjoyed a considerable degree of opulence under the
Roman empire, sunk into the lowest state of poverty and barbarism” (WN III.ii.1, p. 382).
This is a step backward, a destruction of civilization (Skinner 1975, p. 159) that
challenges the alleged inevitable linearity of the development of the four stages.
In Smith’s defense, one could claim that he tells us that the real commercial societies
are in fact superior to any societies in their previous stages of development. Only
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opulent, therefore only commercial, societies can afford the expenses of modern
ﬁrearms. Yet, he also tells us that “the unavoidable effects of the natural progress of
improvement have, in this respect, been a good deal enhanced by a great revolution in the
art of war, to which a mere accident, the invention of gun-power, seems to have given
occasion” (WN V.1.a.44, p. 708; emphasis added). Poor and barbarous nations overrun
opulent and civilized nations, unless we introduce ﬁrearms. But ﬁrearms are introduced
by “mere accident.” The model, if it works at all, works only with an exogenous random
event.

IV. CONCLUSION
A book inquiring into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations ought to be a book on
economic development. It is, as it is many other things. There, as well as in his Lectures,
Smith seems to present models of development, and at the same time offers a long range
of historical examples with which to understand the models and their explanatory
powers. Interestingly enough, though, the examples he chooses to use do not ﬁt the
stadial model of development. They all contradict it.
Smith seems to tell us we want to model the economic system linked to the progress of
opulence, which took centuries and centuries to develop. But he also seems to tell us
opulence developed in unpredictable ways. It happened only in a certain part of the
world, and even there not in a stable way and not necessarily in its most effective form. A
system that connects in our imagination the different points of history may be no
different from a system that connects in our imagination the different points of the
skies. It may be a product of our imagination that needs to be changed under the pressure
of exceptions and contradicting evidence.
If Smith does use the four stages of development, not just as a taxonomy of different
kinds of societies but as an actual model of development, as Meek and Meek-like
interpretations do, why does Smith offer so much contradicting data? I would not go as
far as Brewer (1998, p. 93) in saying “in sum, Book Three of the Wealth of Nations is a
bit of fraud.” Yet, Smith’s results of his “empirical” tests are indeed problematic and may
open the door for questioning the nature of the model itself. For Smith, is the deterministic model of stadial development commonly adopted by his peers actually the appropriate model to explain development? What if a better model is the “inverted” model (for
a recent model of cities as economic drivers for the country, see Duranton and Puga
2019)? Is Smith hinting we should question the presence of a natural order in nature that
can be modeled, or question our ability to do so? What if the system of natural liberty that
is part of the economic development is indeed the result of peculiar circumstances and
historical accidents? What if freedom and prosperity are generated simply by good luck
(Forbes 1975, p. 198)? Smith does not seem to be able (or willing?) to exclude that
possibility.
If we do not consider the stages of development as a simple taxonomy, and if we want
to save the possibility of a stadial developmental as a model of development, what Smith
seems to indicate with his empirical examples is the inappropriateness of the kind of
model used. When the empirical data do not ﬁt our model, maybe it is time to inquire
again.
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